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Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forward
 Soren Kierkegaard
1 Introduction
Rejuvenile is a term coined by Christopher Noxon (2006) to describe adults
dedicated to indulging their inner child. In her review in the WSJ (2006),
Gurdon (2006) goes further to describe rejuveniles as [This] curious mod-
ern hybrid, adult in physique yet deliberately madcap and childlike in tastes,
habits,...1 In this note, we study a neoclassical world populated by over-
lapping generations of rejuveniles and seek to understand the impact of such
preferences on economic growth. For our purposes, rejuveniles are old agents
who derive utility from keeping uptheir consumption with that of the cur-
rent young. 2
1 Noxon (2003) provides more context. Evidence of their presence is widespread.
According to Nielsen Media research, more adults 18 to 49 watch the Cartoon Net-
work than watch CNN. More than 35 million people have caught up with long-lost
school pals on the Web site Classmates.com. ("Theres something about signing on
to Classmates.com that makes you feel 16 again," the "60 Minutes II" correspondent
Vicki Mabrey reported.) Fuzzy pajamas with attached feet come in adult sizes at
Target, along with Scoobie Doo underpants. The average age of video game players
is now 29, up from 18 in 1990, according to the Entertainment Software Associa-
tion. Hello Kittys cartoon face graces toasters. Sea Monkeys come in an executive
set....And then there is Harry Potter, whose cross-generational popularity prompted
the British publisher Bloomsbury to release an edition of the books with so-called
grown-up covers.
2 Then there are people who match their consumption with that of the young by
association. For example, there are 60 million grandparents in the United States
72% of everyone over 50 in the US is a grandparent. Grandparents spend time
and money with their grandchildren over $30 billion in annual spending. Research
shows that going out to a restaurant and watching television together are the ac-
tivities grandparents and grandkids do most.
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Lately there has been some interest in dynamic macroeconomic models fea-
turing extendedpreferences that deviate from the standard additive, time-
separable, homothetic utility the most notable being those that incorporate
a minimum consumption requirement, habit persistence, or keeping up with
the Joneses. 3 This note ts into this larger literature because it explores a
consumption externality similar in spirit to the aforementioned, except for the
fact that the externality studied here is cross generational. In fact, one can
reinterpret the preferences studied in this paper as representing minimum con-
sumption requirements imposed by the consumption patterns of generations
other than ones own, a keeping up with the senior and junior Joneses, if you
will. 4
More generally, we assume that an agent wishes to keep upher consumption
with the rest of the population that is alive at the time, young and old alike.
Within this peer group, we allow some members to have more inuence than
others. For example, it may be that when young, the agent wishes to keep her
consumption more closely paced with members of her own cohort, rather than
cohorts of the previous generation. When old, her consumption may be more
heavily inuenced by cohorts of the current, young generation (in which case,
she would exhibit strong rejuvenile behavior).
In Section 2, we embed these extended preferences into a standard AK model
of growth. In Section 3, somewhat counterintuitively, we nd that the long
run growth rate is higher in the presence of rejuveniles when compared to
3 Alvarez-Cuadado, Monteiro, and Turnovsky (2004) contain a nice discussion of
the empirical underpinings of departures from time-separability.
4 The classic reference on the empirical importance of minimum consumption re-
quirments is Rosenweig and Wolpin (1993) who use Indian data to estimate a min-
imum consumption oor at 56% of the mean household food consumption.
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the benchmark economy (one with no minimum consumption requirements
of any kind). After all, for the old to keep up with the consumption of the
young, the old would have had to save adequately in the past, and it is this
forward-looking thriftiness that fosters growth. We also nd that keeping up
when young hurts growth.
Curiously enough, we also nd that the model with rejuveniles has the po-
tential to generate interesting dynamics in the growth rate, including growth
cycles. The presence of the agents own cohort in her peer group does not
seem to matter much here what does matter, and what sets our formulation
apart from other papers looking at minimum consumption requirements, is
the fact that we allow another generation to inuence the agents consump-
tion decision in this case, the old (when the agent is young) and youth (when
the agent is old). Indeed, in the absence of rejuveniles, the economy at hand
does not generate any growth uctuations. The upshot is that rejuveniles raise
the long run growth rate but their presence may also expose the economy to
endogenous growth uctuations.
In Section 4, we go on to study several other ways of introducing minimum
consumption requirements, such as: a) minimum consumption requirements
that keep up with the level of development of the economy, b) keeping up with
ones own past consumption (aka, habit persistence), and c) keeping up with
ones parents consumption at parallel points in the lifecycle. Interestingly, none
of these preferences can generate any form of endogenous growth uctuations
within our AK model framework.
Our work is in line with the recent paper by Alvarez-Cuadado, Monteiro, and
Turnovsky (2004) who study alternative preference formulations (habit for-
3
mation, keeping up with the Joneses) within the context of a continuous time,
innitely-lived agent framework with a neoclassical production function. Our
results are not strictly comparable given our overlapping generations struc-
ture; especially, their framework is not suited to study the cross generational
keeping up preferences that is our focus. Additionally, while the generation of
growth cycles is our focus, it is not theirs. 5
Our note also relates to a part of a larger literature studying growth cycles (as
opposed to periodicity in levels) in real neoclassical economies. To the best
of our knowledge, all models to date that generate growth cycles are tech-
nology not preference driven (see, for example, Matsuyama (1999) or Walde
(2005)). Our result on the existence of periodic growth equilibria is of some
independent interest. There is a vast literature studying the possibility of
periodic (even chaotic) equilibria in general equilibrium growth models, espe-
cially in overlapping generations models. Most of that literature is concerned
with studying nominal cycles (i.e., uctuations in price levels). 6 The rest of
the literature has focussed on studying real cycles in the levels of the capital
stock or output. As is well-known in that literature, complex dynamics (such
as periodic equilibria) can emerge under assumptions such as limited mar-
ket participation, imperfect competition, and multiple sectors. Additionally,
as discussed in Azariadis (1993), a su¢ ciently strong income e¤ect can cause
savings to decline with an increase in the interest rate, creating a backward-
bendingsavings function that can produce complex dynamics in overlapping
5 Alonso-Carrera, Caballé, and Raurich (2005) study the e¢ ciency properties of
the steady state in the standard innitely-lived neoclassical model under altenative
formulations of habit formation.
6 See Grandmont (1985), Smith (1991), Bhattacharya and Russell (2003), or more
recently, Bunzel (2006) and Koskela and Puhakka (2006).
4
generations models. In our model, periodic equilibria in the real growth rate
emerge in a relatively standard economy; indeed, absent our assumptions on
preferences (especially the presence of rejuveniles), our model economy would
not produce endogenous uctuations of any kind. Thus, ours is not yet an-
other paper demonstrating the presence of complex dynamics in overlapping
generation growth models. Our novelty lies in our ability to a) generate real
growth cycles that are preference not technology driven, and b) to show that
such growth cycles are not possible with almost any other kind of keeping up
preferences.
2 The Model
We analyze a production economy inhabited by an innite sequence of two-
period lived overlapping generations, plus an initial old generation. At each
date, t = 1; 2; 3:::, a new generation is born, consisting of a continuum of agents
with mass 1. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time when young and is
retired when old. Agents do not value leisure, so the allocation of work-time
equals the time endowment of 1. In addition, each initial old agent is endowed
with k1 > 0 units of capital.
There is a single nal good produced using a production function F (Kt; Lt)
where Kt denotes the capital input and Lt denotes the labor input at t: Let
kt  Kt=Lt denote the capital-labor ratio (capital per young agent). Output
per young agent at time tmay be expressed as f(kt) where f(kt)  F (Kt=Lt; 1)
is the intensive production function. The nal good can either be consumed
in the period it is produced, or it can be stored to yield capital the following
period. For reasons of analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate
5
100% between periods.
We assume a standard Ak model with a Romer-style externality, where 
(1   ) denotes capitals (labors) share of output. 7 Firms in the economy
are competitive and factors are paid their marginal product. Let w denote the
wage and R denote the gross interest rate. For future reference,
w (k) = (1  )Ak
and
R = A:
We now dene cross-generational keeping-up preferences. We assume that
agents have preferences represented by the atemporal utility function U (ct; xt)
dened as
U (ct; xt)  (ct   t)
1 
1   +
 (xt   t)1 
1   ;  > 0; t  0; t  0; t  1 (1)
where ct (xt) is the consumption of an agent of generation t when young (old)
and t (t) represents the minimum consumption requirement the agent faces
when young (old). Peeking inside the consumption oors  and ; we posit
that
t  (yct + oxt 1) ;
and
t  (yct+1 + oxt) :
Here, variables with bars represent average levels of consumption, taken
as parametric by the agent. For example, ct represents the average level
7 In other words, we assume Y it = A K

t
 
Kit
  
Lit
1  where i indexes a rm
among a continuum of rms of unit measure, and K denotes the average of all Kis.
If one assumes that rms are all identical, Lit = 1; and  = 1  ; then it is easy to
generate the expressions for w and R in the paper.
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of consumption of the agents generational cohorts when she is young. [Of
course, in equilibrium, ct = ct and xt = xt will hold]. y and o represent
scalars capturing the strength of the inuence of the current youth and current
olds consumption, respectively, on the minimum consumption requirement of
the agent when young. Similarly, y and o represent scalars capturing the
strength of the inuence of the current youth and current olds consumption,
respectively, on the minimum consumption requirement of the agent when old.
Within the context of these preferences, rejuvenile-like behavior is associated
with y > 0:
What sets our formulation apart from other papers looking at minimum con-
sumption requirements is the fact that we allow a generation other than ones
own to inuence the agents consumption decision in this case, the old (when
the agent is young) and youth (when the agent is old), and this pattern of
inuence may change over the agents life. For example, consumption in an
economy is dominantly youth drivenif both y > o and y > o .
From our specication in (1), it is clear that we must assume
ct  t (2)
and
xt  t: (3)
holds in what follows.
Given the capital stock kt and taking everyone elses consumption as given, the
agents choices for ct; xt, and kt+1 conform to the following budget constraints:
ct + kt+1  (1  )Akt (4)
7
xt  Akt+1; (5)
where we have incorporated in (4) and (5) the assumption that date t output
yt = Akt. An agents problem is to maximize (1) subject to (4) and (5).
Furthermore, her optimal choices for ct; xt, and kt+1 all have to be positive.
The rst-order conditions for the agents optimization problem are summa-
rized by the following equation:
xt   t
ct   t = z; (6)
where z  (A)1=.
In the benchmark case, we set t = t = 0: Employing the two budget
constraints (4) and (5) with equality, we can rewrite (6) as
Akt+1
(1  )Akt   kt+1 = z:
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the left-hand side by kt, we have:
At
(1  )A  t
= z; (7)
where t  yt+1=yt = kt+1=kt is the growth rate in output at date t. Solving
for t, we obtain our benchmark growth rate, bm:
bm =
(1  )Az
A+ z
. (8)
Equation (6) for our specic formulation of minimum consumption require-
ments is
xt   (yct+1 + o) xt
ct   (yct + oxt 1) = z;
which after incorporating the denitions of the variables with bars, may be
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rewritten as
(1  o)xt   yct+1
(1  y) ct   oxt 1 = z: (9)
From the budget constraints (4) and (5), and (9), we write, for t  2,
(1  o)Akt+1   y ((1  )Akt+1   kt+2)
(1  y) ((1  )Akt   kt+1)  oAkt = z:
A similar condition applies for date t = 1; as can be seen by incorporating the
budget constraint for the initial old, x0 = Ak1, in (9) for t = 1.
Dividing the numerator and denominator by kt, we express this condition, for
t  1, in growth rates:
t
h
(1  o)A  y

(1  )A  t+1
i
(1  y) ((1  )A  t)  oA
= z: (10)
What is interesting about (10) is the presence of the future growth rate t+1.
The agents belief about the consumption decisions of the future generation
impact on consumption and saving decisions of the agent when young. It is
by this mechanism that keeping uphas the potential to generate equilibrium
cycles in growth rates. Note that if youth has no inuence on the agents
consumption decision when old (y = 0), i.e., no one is a rejuvenile, the future
growth rate drops out of (10), and has no impact on the current growth rate
t.
Solving (10) for t+1 (assuming y > 0) yields the di¤erence equation, for
t  1;
t+1 =
z [(1  y) (1  )A  oA] + t [y (1  )A  (1  o)A  z (1  y)]
yt
.
(11)
A dynamic growth equilibrium for this economy is represented by a sequence
9
of positive growth rates ftg1t=1 ; t  0, that satises (11).
Not surprisingly, the system, with rejuveniles, displays indeterminacy, which
can be indexed by the growth rate for date 1. Given an appropriate value for
1, (11) determines all rates of growth for t  2.
3 Characterizing Equilibria
3.1 Existence
Our minimum consumption requirements (2) and (3) place restrictions on the
magnitude of the primitives of the model. These are summarized by
Assumption 1 (1  ) (1  y) > o:
Assumption 2 (1  o) (1  y) > yo:
Note both assumptions place the restriction that the inuence on the con-
sumption decision of an agents own peer group cannot be too great, i.e.,
y; o < 1.
The constraint (2) requires
(1  y) ct  o_xt 1 , (1  y) ((1  )Akt   kt+1)  oAkt
, [(1  y) (1  )  o]Akt  (1  y) kt+1
and since kt+1 > 0, we require Assumption 1. This assumption also restricts
the growth rate, in the rst instance, to be no greater than , where  
(1  )A  Ao
1 y .
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Examining (10), we see the model also places the restriction that the growth
rate must be greater than , where   max f0; (1  )A A (1  o) =yg,
for otherwise, the numerator in (10) is negative while the denominator is pos-
itive. (This condition also follows from (3)). Assumption 2 ensures  < .
Hence, a valid equilibrium growth sequence ftg1t=1 dened by (11) addition-
ally requires  < t <  for t  1.
Let h (t) denote the function described by the right-hand side of (11). Given
Assumptions 1 and 2, h () has the following properties: 8
P-1 h0 (t) < 0 and h00 (t) > 0 over the interval

; 

:
P-2 h



>  and h () < :
Together, P-1 and P-2 ensure a unique steady-state growth rate (denoted )
exists for all dates t  1. It is easy to verify using (11) that at a steady state
;
 =
a

+ b (12)
holds where
a  z [(1  y) (1  )A  oA]
y
(13)
b  [y (1  )A  (1  o)A  z (1  y)]
y
:
Solving (12) yields  = 1
2
b  1
2
p
4a+ b2 where the root, 1
2
b   1
2
p
4a+ b2; is
negative and hence economically invalid.
Properties P-1 and P-2 are not su¢ cient, however, to ensure h () maps intoh
; 
i
, whereby a sequence ftg1t=1 obtains for any initial 1 2
h
; 
i
. This
requires
8 Condition P-1 can be veried directly by inspection of the right-hand side of (11).
Condition P-2 is veried in the Appendix.
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Fig. 1. The mapping h (:)
Assumption 3 (y (1  )   (1  o))A  (1  y) z.
Note that Assumption 3 implies  = (1  )A   A (1  o) =y. These as-
sumptions also yield the properties
P-3 h0 ()   1
P-4   h () and h



 ,
which ensures h () maps into
h
; 
i
.
The above discussion is summarized pictorially in Figure 1 below. The upshot
is that under Assumptions 1-3, the law of motion for the equilibrium growth
rate is downward sloping and that there is a unique stationary growth rate.
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3.2 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we address two related issues: i) how does keeping up
a¤ect the steady-state growth rate, and ii) how steady-state growth in this
model compares with the benchmark growth rate bm, that is, growth in a
model where t = t = 0:
Proposition 1 Keeping upwhen young lowers the steady-state growth rate;
keeping upwhen old raises the growth rate.
A formal proof of Proposition 1, provided in the Appendix, involves describing
how the curve in Figure 1 will shift with a change in one of the four keeping up
parameters, i; i; i = y; o. The intuition behind this proposition, however, is
simple. A greater value for either keeping up parameter (y or o) requires the
agent, when young, to devote more of her wage income to current consumption
and less to saving. This in turn leads to a lower growth rate. On the other hand,
the greater the keeping up parameters y; o, the more the agent saves in order
to meet the greater consumption commitment when old, which increases the
growth rate. Counter to what might be expected, rejuvenile behavior actually
contributes to greater economic growth; after all, for the old to keep up with
the consumption of the young, the old would have had to save adequately in
the past and it is this forward-looking thriftiness that fosters growth.
Given the ambiguous way in which keeping up, in general, a¤ects growth, it
would seem that the steady-state growth rate in this model may be either
greater or less than the benchmark growth bm. However, with Assumption
3, we have:
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Proposition 2 If y < o, the steady-state growth rate in this model is greater
than in the benchmark case, (1  )Az= (A+ z) :
The condition y < o, along with Assumption 3, implies bm < h (). Since
h (t) > h () for all t 2
h
; 
i
; the proposition is true.
Having explored the properties of the steady state growth rate, we now move
on to study the dynamics of the growth rate. We are particularly interested
in the possibility that the growth rate may exhibit endogenous cyclical uc-
tuations. From P-1, we know that in the presence of rejuveniles (y > 0) ; the
law of motion h (:) is negatively sloped everywhere suggesting the possibility
of such uctuations near the steady state. We address this potential next.
3.3 Cycles
Heuristically, we can describe the possibility of growth cycles as follows. Sup-
pose the young at date t believe that when they are old, the young at t + 1
will have fairly low levels of consumption (i.e., they save a lot and the growth
rate t+1 is high). This will imply keeping upwith the young at t + 1 will
not require a large amount of savings on the part of the young at date t 
hence they consume more when young and the growth rate t is low. But
what makes the young choose to save more at t + 1? If the young at date
t + 2 face a similar prospective future as the young at t, they will choose a
high level of consumption, thereby making keeping upmore di¢ cult for the
old at t+ 2 (the young at t+ 1), which is countered by greater saving by the
young at date t+ 1.
It is convenient, for our purposes here, to rewrite the law-of-motion (11). Let
14
 denote the steady-state of (11), and let    h0 () < 0 (see P-2) . We can
then write (see the Appendix)
t+1 = (1 +  ) 
   (
)2  
t
: (14)
Equation (14) can be used to characterize stable 2-period ip cycles.
Let o (e ) denote the growth rate at odd (even) dates, respectively. In a
2-period cycle, we then have
eo=(1 +  ) 
o   ()2   (15)
eo=(1 +  ) 
e   ()2  
A trivial solution to (15), of course, is e = o = 
, the 1-cycle or the steady
state. However, we seek solutions to (15) with o 6= e. From (15), it is
clear no such solutions exist unless   =  1, in which case the system (15) is
underdetermined and a continuum of solutions exist. For a given value for
o, e = (
)2 =o holds, as can be seen from (15) evaluated at   =  1. We
provide two examples below.
Example 1 Let  = 1=3;  = 1;  = 2=3; A = 3; y = 2=3; o = 0;
y = 1=3; o = 2=3. In this case, the steady-state growth rate  =
p
2: An
example of an equilibrium with 2-cycles is summarized by the pair (o; e) =
(5=3; 1:20) :
Example 2 (Youth Driven Consumption) Retain the same parameter val-
ues as above except for y and o: Let y = 1=2 and o = 1=3: The steady-
state growth rate  = 2=
p
3. An example of a 2-cycle equilibrium pair is
(o; e) = (4=3; 1).
Examining (11) and (14) reveals that   =  1 when b, in (13), equals zero. This
15
in turn implies stable 2-period ip cycles are possible whenever the parameters
y, o, and y satisfy
y (1  )A  (1  o)A = z (1  y) . (16)
The parameter values of the two examples above were selected to conform to
this condition.
By a similar construction, using (14), it is easy to show that cycles of higher
periodicity are not possible. These results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Stable cycles exist only in the case where   =  1 (see (16))
and in that instance, only cycles of periodicity two are possible.
If   >  1, all equilibrium sequences with 1 6= , converge, in an alternating,
periodic fashion, to the steady-state .
4 Alternative Forms of Keeping UpPreferences
Part of our interest in studying these preferences was to identify whether
endogenous uctuations in growth rates could arise purely from preferences.
Recall that a necessary condition for any kind of volatility in growth rates is
that the law of motion for growth not be positively sloped everywhere. One
thing we know for sure is that the benchmark model (with  =  = 0) will not
deliver growth cycles. We also now know that in the presence of rejuveniles,
ip growth cycles are possible. Phrased di¤erently, then, our issue becomes:
can alternative reasonable specications of keeping up preferences produce a
(somewhere) negatively sloped law of motion?
16
We identify three popular alternatives found in the literature: i) keeping up
with a consumption minimum dened as a function of current output (used
most recently in Alvarez and Diaz, 2005), ii) keeping up with a standard of
living established by ones parents (also known as generational keeping up,
used in de la Croix and Michel, 2002), and iii) keeping up with ones past
consumption (also known, simply as habit formation, used for example in
Alessei and Lusardi, 1997, or Bunzel, 2006). We discuss briey how each of
these alternatives would work in our current framework.
4.1 Consumption Minimum as a Function of Current Output
One popular form of keeping up, intended to mimic a keeping up with the
Jonesesargument assumes that agents desire to keep up with a consumption
minimum dened as a function of current output. Often this consumption
minimum is interpreted as a time-evolving poverty line. In this formulation,
t = yt and t = yt+1; with 1    >  and  > . Constraints (2) and (3)
are replaced with
ct yt
xt yt+1
The marginal conditions for the agents problem, with the changes indicated
above, can be summarized by (6). The counterpart to (10) is
Akt+1   Akt+1
((1  )Akt   kt+1)  Akt = z;
which reduces to
(  )At
(1  )A  t   A
= z: (17)
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Solving for the growth rate, one gets
t =
Az (1    )
(  )A+ z ;
for all t  1 and hence it is clear that no uctuations in growth rates are
possible here. Here too the stationary growth rate may be greater or less than
baseline bm; the di¤erence, t   bm is
 zA [(A+ z)     (1  )A]
(A+ z) ((  )A+ z) ;
which is greater than or less then 0 depending on whether  (1  )A ?
(A+ z) .
4.2 Generational Keeping Up
The overlapping generations framework allows us to consider the possibility
that parents may, in part, shape the consumption decisions of their o¤spring.
de la Croix and Michel (2002) consider such keeping upe¤ects in a neoclas-
sical growth model. These sorts of preferences can generate cycles in levels.
We briey describe here how they would work in a model with Ak technology
and growth rates. 9
We assume the agents utility depends on how much her own consumption
di¤ers from the consumption of her parents (denoted ct 1 and xt 1 above and
taken as given by the agent) at parallel points in their life. The parameters
9 Our discussion here is somewhat broader as we allow the parents consumption
when young and old to a¤ect the childs utility both when young and old, while de
la Croix and Michel (2002) assume the parents consumption directly only a¤ects
the childs utility when young.
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 and  determine how much weight the agent places on keeping upin each
stage in life. We replace (2) and (3) with
ct ct 1
xt xt 1
Like our framework with rejuveniles, generational keeping up introduces a
time dynamic in the equation for the equilibrium growth rate. The rst order
conditions for the agentsproblem for dates t  1 can be summarized by (6),
with t = ct 1 and t = xt 1: The counterpart to (10) for dates t  2 is
Akt+1   Akt
(1  )Akt   kt+1    [(1  )Akt 1   kt] = z;
which readily reduces to
Att 1   At 1
(1  )At 1   tt 1   
h
(1  )A  t 1
i = z: (18)
This yields the law-of-motion for the growth rate t for dates t  2 as follows:
t = bm +
A+ z
A+ z
   (1  )Az
(A+ z) t 1
 H

t 1

(19)
A quick examination of equation (19) reveals thatH 0

t 1

 0 implying that
generational keep up preferences cannot generate endogenous uctuations in
the growth rate.
Unlike in the rejuvenile formulation above, however, the initial growth rate 1
is not indeterminate. For date t = 1; the marginal conditions can be summa-
rized by
Ak2   Ak1
(1  )Ak1   k2   c0 = z;
where k1 and c0 are given. Dividing the numerator and denominator by k1
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yields
1 =
A+ (1  )Az   zc0=k1
A+ z
or
1 = bm +
A  zc0=k1
A+ z
Although c0 and k1 are given at date 1, they presumably are selected together
and satisfy a budget constraint similar to (4) and (5). Let c0 = (1  )Ak0 k1;
where k0 is given. Substituting in expression above, and dividing the numerator
and denominator by k1, we have
1 = bm +
A+ z
A+ z
   (1  )Az
(A+ z) 0
.
which is of the same form as (19).
4.3 Habit Formation
In this formulation, we set t = 0 in (2) and replace t in (3) with
xt  ct:
Unlike the form of keeping uppresented in the previous sections and the
other two alternatives listed above, the agent, when young, will internalize
this minimum requirement when selecting ct: The counterpart to (6) in this
case is:
(xt   ct)
ct
= ez; (20)
where ez  ( (A+ ))1=. Incorporating the budget constraints (4) and (5)
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into this expression, we derive the counterpoint to (10) as
(Akt+1    ((1  )Akt   kt+1))
(1  )Akt   kt+1 =
ez;
which reduces to
(At    ((1  )A  t))
(1  )A  t
= ez: (21)
The growth rate in this economy is constant for all t  1 (hence no possibility
of endogenous uctuations) and satises:
t =
ez (1  )A
A+ ez :
Comparing this solution with the baseline growth rate bm is easy since it
is in a form similar to the baseline with ez replacing z. Since the baseline is
increasing in z, and since ez > z, it follows that the growth rate here is greater
than baseline. This of course makes perfect sense and is consistent with the
general nding in our keeping upformulation: the habit formation parameter
motivates the agent to nd ways to increase her consumption when old - the
way to do this is increase saving when young, which leads to a higher growth
rate.
5 Conclusion
Real growth cycles (cycles in the growth rate of real per capita income) are
observed in almost every country around the world. Economists have sought
to generate these cycles within the neoclassical paradigm. Toward that end,
they have had to rely on changing the formulation of technology away from the
usual neoclassical textbook specications. In this note, we ask the question:
Can a simple change in preferences deliver growth cycles? The only preference
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structure that has the potential to generate such cycles is one where agents face
minimum consumption requirements imposed by the consumption patterns of
generations other than ones own. We dene rejuveniles as old agents who
derive utility from keeping uptheir consumption with some measure of the
consumption of the current young. We show that rejuveniles raise the long run
growth rate but their presence may also expose the economy to endogenous
growth uctuations.
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Appendix
1. Proof of P-2 Suppose  = (1  )A   A (1  o) =y. The di¤erence
h



   can be written as:
h



   = z [(1  y)  (1  y) o   oy]
y [(1  ) y + o   ] :
The numerator of this di¤erence is positive, by Assumption 2. The assumption
that (1  )A   A (1  o) =y > 0 ensures that the denominator is also
positive; hence, h



> .
If (1  )A   A (1  o) =y < 0;  = 0: Since lim
 !0h () = 1, the result
h



>  holds.
At  = ;
   h () = A [(1  y) (1  o)  yo]
y (1  y) ;
which is positive, by Assumption 2.
2. Proof of P-3 We have:
h0 (t) =
  [A (1  y) (1  )  Ao] z
y2t
;
which can be written as
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h0 (t) =
 a
2t
where a is dened in (13). When Assumption 3 holds with equality, b, in (13),
equals zero and  =
p
a, so h0 () =  1: When Assumption 3 holds with
strict inequality, b > 0 and  >
p
a, hence h0 () >  1:
3. Proof of P-4 First,  = [y (1  )  (1  o)]A=y > 0, by Assumption
3.
The di¤erence h ()   = 0: The di¤erence    h



equals
 h



=
 [(1  y) (1  o)  yo] [A (y (1  )   (1  o))  (1  y) z]
y (1  y) [y (1  )   (1  o)] .
Assumption 3 ensures y (1  ) >  (1  o). Assumption 2 and Assump-
tion 3 ensure the numerator above is positive.
4. Proof Proposition 1 We analyze below the impact on h (t) (11) of a
marginal change in each of the keeping up parameters. These indicate how
the curve in Figure 1 will shift for a change in each of these variables; the
result of the proposition then follows.
a. @t+1
@y
=  ((1 )A t)z
yt
< 0:
b. @t+1
@o
=  Az
yt
< 0:
c. @t+1
@y
= A
y
> 0:
d. z(1 y)t+A[ (1 )(1 y)z+(1 o)t+oz]
yt
:
In last case, the numerator is increasing in t. Evaluated at t = , the
numerator equals
A (1  o) [A (y (1  )   (1  o))  (1  y) z] + yoAz,
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which is positive by Assumption 3.
5. Proof Proposition 2 Form the di¤erence
h ()  bmh ()  bm =
A [A (y (1  )   (1  o))  (1  o) z]
y (A+ z)
:
FromAssumption 3,A (y (1  )   (1  o)) > (1  y) z, which is greater
than (1  o) z if y < o.
6. Derivation of (14) By denition,     z[(1 y)(1 )A  oA]
y()2
. We can
then write
(11) as
t+1 =
   ()2
t
+
[y (1  )A  (1  o)A  z (1  y)]
y
:
Evaluating this expression at the steady-state (t = t+1 = 
), we have:
 =    + [y(1 )A (1 o)A z(1 y)]
y
; or
[y (1  )A  (1  o)A  z (1  y)]
y
= (1 +  ) :
We can then write (11) as
t+1 = (1 +  ) 
     (
)2
t
:
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